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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
adjournments and delays but also failed to raise the point until the appeal in
the Appellate Division. The Court held that such conduct constituted a waiver. A
defendant cannot participate in a trial and save his objection of undue delay to
challenge an adverse verdict.
96
In People v. Chirieleison,
the defendant, after completion of a prison
sentence, was held for trial on a five-year old charge. After denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment and the dismissal of his appeal by the Appellate Division
upon the ground that the order was intermediate and not appealable, 97 the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser crime. Holding that the indictment should have been
dismissed when the motion was first made, the Court said that the defendant's
subsequent plea of guilty may not be deemed a waiver.

The weight of precedent gives credence to the decisions reached in the above
instances. In People v. Perry,98 defendant's attorney consented to postponement of
the trial. The court in holding this conduct to be a waiver of the defendant's right
to a speedy trial said, as did the court in Beavers v. Hanbert,9 9 that the right of a
speedy trial is necessarily relative and may be waived; it depends upon the circumstances. In People ex rel lanik v. Daly,1 the defendant's acquiescence in postponement of the trial was held to be a waiver. In People v. Russo,2 the defendant
sought to have the conviction vacated alleging that he had been deprived of his
right to a speedy trial. The court in denying the defendant's motion replied that
the defendant's failure to raise the objection at the time of trial constituted a
waiver.
While it is well settled that an indicted person has a right to a speedy trial,3
he is not affirmatively obliged to seek such a trial.4 If the prosecution delays in
procuring a trial, the defendant may raise the objection that he has not been
granted a speedy trial and move for the dismissal of the indictment.5
Public Trial
In interpreting statutory provisions the spirit and purpose of the statute and
the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in
96. 3 N.Y.2d 170, 164 N.Y.S2d 726 (1957).
97. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROc. §517; In re Montgomery, 126 App. Div. 72, 110
N.Y. Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1908), appeal dismissed, 193 N.Y. 659, 87 N.E. 1123
(1908); People v. Reed, 276 N.Y. 5, 11 N.E.2d 330 (1937).
98. 196 Misc. 922, 96 N.Y.S.2d 517 (County Ct. 1949).
99. 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
1. 30 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 47, 142 N.Y. Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
2. 3 Misc. 2d 916, 155 N.Y.S.2d 765 (County Ct. 1956).
3.

N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §8.

4. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (:1955); Petition of Provoo,
17 F.R.D. 183 (1955), aff'd on motion, 350 U.S. 857; 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 53 (1956).
5. N.Y. CODE CmRI. PROC. §668.
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mind.6 But the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the grammatical construction should be adhered to unless it is at variance with that legislative intent."
The Court in New York Post Corp. v,. Leibou'itz," by statutory interpretation,
found that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to obtain a copy of the charge
to the jury, on the grounds that the judge had a duty to make them available upon
request. This duty was found by holding that a charge to the jury was a "decision"
within the meaning of the constitutional mandate requiring that judicial opinions
or decisions be free for publication.0 The right of the plaintiff newspaper to the
0
charge to the jury was found in the Public Officers Law' and the Judiciary Law.'
The former requires a person having custody of records or papers in a public
office to make transcripts of them upon request and payment of a fee. The latter
dictates that a court stenographer must write out the minutes of a proceeding if
requested by the judge of the court or by a person legally entitled thereto. The
Court found that the notes of the stenographer were records, and that the stenographer was a person in public office within the meaning of the Public Officers
Law. From this the Court concluded that anyone upon request and payment of a
fee is entitled to a copy of the stenographer's notes, and that the stenographer,
under the Judiciary Law, is required to write out the notes of the proceeding
requested. The Court felt that any other interpretation of these statutes would
result in a conflict with the constitutional requirement of free publication of
judicial decisions.
There is no doubt that one of the basic freedoms of our society is a public
trail, nor is there any doubt that complete press coverage insures that a trial will
be public. "' That a newspaper be entitled, as a matter of right, to a charge to the
jury does not seem to raise any serious objections, but the reasons the Court
advances as a basis for this right are not entirely persuasive. The Court seems to
hinge this right upon the conclusion that a charge to the jury is a "decision" under
the Constitution. The cases they cite hold that a charge to the jury may become the
13
law of the case if not objected to by either party or if affirmed upon appeal.
But the law of a case is not necessarily a decision, rather it is usually an instruc6. People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1937); River Brand Rice
Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
7. United States v. Montgomery Ward, 150 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1945); Surace
v. Sanna, 248 N.Y. 18, 161 N.E. 315 (1928).
8. 2 N.Y.2d. 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957).
9. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §22, states:
. . . all laws and judicial opinions or decisions shall nevertheless be free for publication by any person.
10.

11.
12.
(1932).
13.
Buchin

N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §301.

§66.

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Note, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381

Lenard v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 297 N.Y. 103, 75 N.E.2d 261 (1947);
v. Long Is. Ry., 286 N.Y. 146, 36 N.E.2d 88 (1941).
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tion, a jury charge, or a ruling made on a former appeal, 14 and its effect is limited
to a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. 15 Nor does the law of the case necessarily
involve reaching a conclusion, as does a decision.' 0 Even if it is assumed that a
charge to the jury is a decision there is no authority given for the contention that
the Constitution intended to apply to decisions not filed in the office of the clerk
of the court. Therefore it seems questionable whether mandamus should lie on
the grounds that the judge had a duty to make the charge available.
The Court also seems to be reaching too far in calling the stenographers'
notes records in a public office. The statutes provide a means for having the
notes written out and filed with the clerk of the court; 17 until this is done they
can hardly be termed as records.' s Further to say that the stenographers' notes are
records and thereby requiring the stenographer to write them out upon anyone's
request seems to defeat the purpose of section 301 of the Judiciary Law, since that
section requires the court stenographer to write out the notes of a proceeding only
if the judge of the court so directs, or if required to do so by a person entitled
by law to a copy. Section 300 of the Judiciary Law defines persons entitled to a
transcript as being the party, his attorney, the judge, and in criminal cases, the
prosecuting attorney. The interpretation that the Court placed upon these statutes
seems to go beyond their ordinary meaning, and the intent of the legislature.
The "right" given to the plaintiff to obtain a copy of the minutes of a proceeding,
thought not objectionable in itself, lacks adequate definition. Is the "right" only
available to one who seeks it for publication purposes, or is it available to anyone
for any purpose? Is the "right" to be available in cases where the court excludes
the general public for purposes of preserving the public decency? If such a right
is to be created the power to create it lies in the legislature, where it can be
adequately defined and controlled, and not in the courts.' 9
Trial-Righf Of Defendanf To Be Free Of Shackles
Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure20 codifies the common law 2 '
14. Mann v. Simpson & Co., 286 N.Y. 450, 36 N.E.2d 658 (1941); Douglas v.
Manfree Realty Corp., 263 App. Div. 998, 33 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2d Dep't 1942); Walker
Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 173 Misc. 455, 17 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct.

1940).
15. Walker v. Gerli, 257 App. Div. 249, 12 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1st Dep't 1939).
16. Lambros v. Young, 145 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
17. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAw §13.

18. People v. Clurman, 290 N.Y. 242. 48 N.E.2d 505 (1943); American District
Telegraph Co. v. Woodbury, 127 App. Div. 455, 112 N.Y. Supp. 165 (3d D.ep't
1908); Goldsmith v. Hubbard, 183 Misc. 889, 52 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
19. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925); Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N.Y.
357 (1876).
20. N.Y.CODE CRIM. PROC. §10 provides:

21.

• . . [Nior can a person charged with a crime be subject,
before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for
his detention to answer the charge.
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(1850).

